The Financial Background of the European Deposit Guarantee Schemes and the Resolution Mechanism by Tóth, József
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Financial Background of the
European Deposit Guarantee Schemes
and the Resolution Mechanism
Jo´zsef To´th
King Sigismund College, Budapest, Hungary
4. June 2015
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/64794/
MPRA Paper No. 64794, posted 9. June 2015 14:35 UTC
JÓZSEF TÓTH  
 
The Financial Background of the European Deposit Guarantee 
Schemes and the Resolution Mechanism  
 
The new directives of the European Parliament and the European Council issued in 2014 define 
unified expectations regarding deposit guarantee schemes and regarding banking resolution 
mechanism to be applied in territory of each EU member states. Moreover, the so called Single 
Resolution Fund must be implemented by euro member states in order to finance the resolution 
processes. The article introduces the main rules of the unified systems as well as deals with their 
financial background. The European Commission declared in its statement the target level of the 
Single Resolution Fund which is EUR 55 billion. However, we provide evidence that this target 
level is underestimated.  
 
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL): E53, E58, G20, G21, G28, G38 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Herman Van Rompuy [2012] recommended numerous measures in order to stabilize the European 
economic and monetary union in his report made for the European Commission (hereinafter 
Commission), the Euro group and the European Central Bank. One of them was the intention of 
establishing an integrated financial system which is nowadays called simply as Banking Union.  
Pillars of the Banking Union are defined in more regulations and directives in the European Union. 
The European Parliament approved the proposals of the Commission concerning European Single 
Supervisory Mechanism in 2013. From November 2014, it brought significant changings in the 
banking supervisory activity. Participation is compulsory for each euro zone member state but others 
from the European Union could also join to the system.  
After regulating the banking supervision, two new pillars were created within the Banking Union in 
2014. The first one is related to the bank deposit guarantee scheme (hereinafter DGS) and the second 
one deals with banking resolution: the European Parliament and the European Council issued their 
common directive on the banking deposit scheme [2014a] in April and one month later they issued 
their directive on recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms [2014b]. The 
directives give framework for issues concerning bank deposit guarantee as well as banking resolution 
and define the rules based on which the financial background of the systems could be created. 
The Parliament and the Council also issued a regulation [2014c] that defines uniform rules and 
uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the euro 
zone. We have to note, generally a regulation of the European Parliament and the European Council 
automatically takes effect in each member state but in this case the regulation itself narrows its 
territorial effect. It must be used in the euro zone. According to this regulation the so called Single 
Resolution Fund is to be created. This fund will embody the financial background of the banking 
resolution.  
Numerous articles deal with the disadvantage and advantage of the integrated financial system.  
Ensuring the financial stability of the Union is the main goal of the Banking Union. Nevertheless, 
stability cannot be achieved by separated national efforts.  Schoenmaker [2011] proves that 
maintaining the financial stability, strengthening the financial integration and enforcing national 
financial policies are incompatible. Any two of the three could be combined but they make the third 
impossible. It is the so called financial trilemma which is observable in the practice: the risk of cross-
border banking and investment service cannot be managed by national policies either the financial 
stability or the financial integration hurts.  
Vítor Constâncio [2013] the vice president of the European Central Bank described in his presentation 
in February 2013: “The recent financial crisis demonstrated how quickly and powerfully problems in 
the financial sector of one country can spread to another. This is especially the case in a monetary 
union. As a result, problems in the banking sector might originate at the national level, but are more 
and more likely to affect other countries of the euro area as well, and may quickly threaten the stability 
of the entire euro area banking system.” 
In case of euro zone, the dominance of the large banks is well observable. The summarized balance 
sheet total of 10 largest banks is 51.33% of the aggregated balance sheet total of each credit institution 
in the euro zone (approximately 5600 credit institutions). The asymmetry is illustrated by the 
following chart: 
 
Chart 1  
Asymmetry in distribution of the balance sheet total in euro zone 2011-2014 
 
Source: Consolidated financial statements of the banks and European Central Bank 
 
According to the practice applied before implementing the new resolution rules, significant bank in 
financial difficulties was bailed out by taxpayers’ money of the sovereign it belonged to. However, on 
the one hand this solution was not applicable in case of significant European banks, since their balance 
sheet total was (is) too large to be able to bail out them. On the other hand the taxpayers bailed out the 
banks which raised moral issues. Hence, by implementing the new resolution rules the owners and the 
creditors are the main cost payers of the banking resolution.  
In Claessen at al. [2010] opinion, the national authorities make decision by taking the local interest 
into account during crisis and they do not deal with the cross-border activity of the institution in 
trouble. This attitude refers also to one of the ingredients of the financial trilemma. According to 
Engineer, M at al. [2012], the different interest of the national authorities is the reason for fragmented 
system of deposit guarantee schemes. Howarth and Quaglia [2014] built their theory on the financial 
trilemma. They highlight a fourth aspect. The fact of being member of the euro zone can also cause 
difficulties. By introducing the common currency, the joining countries have lost their interventional 
tools that had been used in adverse cases. In Micossi, Bruzzone and Carmassi [2013] opinion when 
building up the Banking Union the resolution procedure was unreasonably emphasized and the 
intention of unifying the deposit guarantee schemes was neglected. In paper of Pisany-Ferry,J. at al 
[2012] the authors deal with the same issue by calling attention on the risk of deposit guarantee 
schemes managed by sovereigns. In their opinion remaining under sovereign management the 
effectiveness of the mechanisms could be undermined. Gros and Schoenmaker [2014] recommend 
implementing a European deposit insurance and resolution authority (EDIRA). As it will be 
highlighted afterwards, this proposal is partly realized. 
In the following chapters we analyse the bank deposit insurance and resolution systems based on the 
directives. Though, activity of the investment firms are also covered by the directives and regulation 
mentioned, our analysis and findings are related to the banks. 
2. The European deposit guarantee schemes 
 
The directive of the European Parliament and Council [2014a] disposes the expectation to implement 
at least one deposit insurance system in each member state. According to the analysis of the European 
Commission [2013], generally one system works in the member states, but there are some exceptions. 
There are 5 systems in Austria, in Germany 4 systems operate and 2-2 schemes are maintained in 
Italy, Cyprus and Portugal.   
According to the CRD IV (Directive of the European Parliament and Council [2013b]) a credit 
institution allowed to take deposits in a member state if this institution is member of a guaranty 
scheme. Therefore, a credit institution is allowed to take deposits in a member state even if this 
institution is not member of the guarantee scheme of the country in question.  
According to the directive of the deposit guarantee scheme, the deposit and the related compound 
interest is protected up to EUR 100 000.  
If a parent bank from non EU member state establishes branch in an EU member state, the authority of 
this EU state must check the deposit guarantee system of non EU member state the parent bank 
belongs to. The protection of deposits must be the same in that case. If it is not fulfilled, the branch 
must join to the DGS of the EU member state. Let’s see an example! Suppose an Australian parent 
bank establishes a branch in Poland. In this case, the Polish authority checks the Australian DGS. 
Among other things it examines if the deposits are protected at least up to EUR 100 000 in the 
Australian system. In other words, the authority must make sure whether the Australian deposit fund 
pays decent amount in reasonable cases or not. If the answer is no, the branch has to join to the Polish 
DGS (or DGS of any EU member state). 
 
3. Financing the deposit guarantee schemes 
 
The banking annual contribution is the main source of the deposit guarantee schemes. The target level 
is 0.8% of the covered deposits that must be reached by the member states by 3 July 2024. However, 
the recent value of assets of the DGSs already exceeds the target level in some member states. The 
following chart shows ratio of the available assets to the covered deposits of some member states as of 
31/12/2012. 
 
Chart 2 
Ratio of the available assets to the covered deposits of some member states the member states as of 
31/12/2012 
 
 Source: European Commission [2013], own calculation 
0,8% 
The fund must be invested in low risk and diversified manner. The assets of the deposit guaranty funds 
must be primary used in order to compensate the deposit owners. However, during low risk 
environment, member states might allow that the systems use the available assets for alternative 
purposes. For example, alternative usage might be crediting another DGS.  
We note, the DGSs remain under national management. Mutual deposit guarantee fund is not created 
by the member states of the euro zone, either.  
 
4. Resolution mechanism  
 
4.1 General rules  
 
The directive [2014b] as well as the regulation [2014c] of the European Parliament and Council 
brought significant changings in the process of resolution of the credit institutions being in critical 
financial situation. The directive is to be used in territory of each EU member state but the regulation 
must be applied only in the euro zone countries. Since one of the elements of the financial stability 
management is raised from national to European mutual level, as it also happened in case of 
introduction the single supervisory mechanism, the trilemma of Schoenmaker has been broken.   
Earlier if a government intended to bail-out a financial institution jeopardizing the financial stability of 
the country, the financial background of the rescue was provided by the tax payers. According to the 
new rules, applying the bail-in method the owners and the creditors (except for the owners of the 
covered deposits) become the payers of the resolution. Moreover, other tools are also available for the 
resolution authority. These tools will be introduced afterwards. 
The maintenance of the critical function of the credit institution, avoidance of the unfavourable effect 
jeopardizing the financial stability and protection the depositors are the main purposes of the 
resolution mechanism. Nevertheless, more preconditions must be fulfilled in order to implement 
transparent resolution process. 
At first, a resolution authority is needed to be independent from the supervisory authority. We note, 
the supervisory authority also participate in the resolution processes, it has predefined tasks during the 
resolution.  
Also, credit institutions are obliged to compile their own recovery plan that must be updated annually. 
This plan must be sent to the supervisory authority. The authority examines the appropriateness of the 
plan, for example it investigates the capital and financial structure of the bank or checks if the plan 
contains proper measures for different unfavourable scenarios. The supervisory authority also has to 
examine whether there is any obstacle in implementation of the measures defined in the recovery plan. 
If the plan appropriate, the supervisory authority hands over the plan to the resolution authority. Based 
on the data of the recovery plan, the resolution authority makes resolution plan. 
As it was mentioned in the introduction, an internationally active bank could jeopardize the financial 
stability of the whole region within which bank operates. In order to avoid this trap, an internationally 
active bank must compile group-wide recovery plan that must be submitted to the consolidated 
supervisory authority (in case of significant banks in the euro zone it is the European Central Bank). 
This plan (if appropriate) is passed to the group-level resolution authority, the related supervisory 
authorities and the related resolution authorities. That is, decision must be made on consolidated level.  
The supervisory authority is also entitled to use different tools in the early interventional phase (pre-
resolution phase). For example the authority might require the management body of the institution to 
implement one or more measures specified in the recovery plan, the authority is entitled to convene the 
meeting of the shareholders in order to decide on certain measures or the authority is entitled to require 
one or more members of the management body or senior management to be removed or replaced.  
 
4.2 Initiation of the resolution  
 
The resolution directive defines the circumstances when resolution must be initiated. If in the opinion 
of the supervisory authority the credit institution is close to the bankruptcy, neither further supervisory 
measures, nor additional investor financial support could help, the resolution process must be initiated.  
When governing the resolution, the authority has to take that principal into consideration according to 
which the shareholders of the institution under resolution must be the first and the creditors must be 
the second loss bearers of the resolution. This rule can be evaluated as the most important changing in 
the process of the bank resolution. 
When initiating the resolution, the management body and senior management of the institution under 
resolution must be replaced. Moreover, it must be examined whether natural and legal persons are 
responsible for failure of the bank or not.  
During the resolution process the sale of the business, usage of bridge institution, asset separation and 
the bail-in tools are available for the resolution authorities. These tools can be combined or can be 
applied separately. If the sale of business or usage of bridge institution tools are employed and only 
part of assets, liabilities and right handed over, the residual institution must be wound up under normal 
insolvency proceedings.  
 
4.3 The sale of business tool 
 
When using the sale of business tool, the resolution authority has right to sell the shares, assets, rights 
and liabilities of the institution under resolution procedure. The purchaser must be dealt as successor. 
During usage of the sale of business tool the resolution authority must fulfil numerous criteria. The 
conflict of interest rules must be kept, the transparency of the transaction must be ensured, the unduly 
favour or discrimination between potential purchaser must be excluded as well as the need of quick 
resolution and the purpose of the price maximizing must be taken into account.  
 
4.4 Bridge institution tool 
 
The resolution authority entitled to apply bridge institution in the resolution process. Doing so, the 
authority has right to transfer the assets, rights, liabilities, shares possessed or issued by the institution 
under resolution to a bridge institution without consent of the shareholders. The bridge institution must 
be owned by one or more public authority. The bridge institution is controlled by the resolution 
authority. Receiving and holding some or all of the shares or some or all of the assets, rights and 
liabilities of the institution under resolution with a view to maintain the critical functions and to sell 
the institution are the main purposes when funding bridge institution. The resolution authority appoints 
the management body of the bridge institution and specifies the risk profile of the institution. The 
management should pursue to maintain the critical function of the credit institution and to sell the 
bridge institution under the possibly best condition.  
When taking over the assets and liabilities, the value of the assets has to be higher than the liabilities. 
That is, just a certain part of the liabilities is taken over by the bridge institution. This solution ensures 
the viability of the bridge institution.  
 
4.5 Asset separation tool  
 
When applying the asset separation tool, the resolution authority has right to hand over the assets, 
rights and liabilities of the credit institution under resolution procedure or to hand over the bridge 
institution to an asset management vehicle.  
The asset management vehicle shall be a legal person that wholly or partially owned by a public 
authority and is controlled by the resolution authority. While holding the critical function is the main 
purpose of the bridge institution, the price maximising through sale or orderly wind down are the goals 
of usage the asset separation tool. 
 
4.6 The bail-in tool 
 
As it mentioned above, the cost of keeping alive the credit institution in difficult financial situation 
was paid by the taxpayers earlier. However, by virtue of the new directive, the owners and the 
creditors are the primer payers of the resolution cost of the credit institutions. This mechanism is 
fulfilled by deleting or dilution of the shares, by reducing the principal amount of claims or debt 
instruments or by converting claims to share.  
The mentioned measures can be applied in case of any liability except for covered deposits, secured 
liabilities, liabilities with a remaining maturity of less than seven days and salary liabilities.  
In order that the bail-in tool might be applied, the credit institution should meet the minimum criteria 
of the own fund and eligible liabilities. That is, the following has to be fulfilled:  
 
 
𝑂𝐹+𝐸𝐿
𝑂𝐹+𝐸𝐿+𝑂𝐿
∙ 100% > 𝐼𝑀,     (1) 
 
where 
OF  own fund,  
EL  eligible liability, this liability might be taken into account when applying the bail-in tool,  
OL  other liability, this liability is not taken into account when applying the bail-in tool,  
IM institute-specific minimal requirement and 
 
 
𝐸𝐿 + 𝑂𝐿 = 𝐿,       (2) 
 
where 
 
L  total liabilities. 
 
The value of the IM is specified by the resolution authority and depends on numerous criteria. There is 
no a predefined value, it is different in case of different institutions. However, in case of “Union parent 
credit institution”, the minimum requirement must be determined on consolidated-level.  
 
When applying the bail-in tool, write down or conversion of capital instruments, the following 
sequence must be kept by the resolution authority:  
common equity Tier 1 items, 
additional Tier 1 items, 
Tier 2 instruments, 
subordinated debts, 
rest of eligible liabilities. 
Let’s see an example! Suppose the resolution authority decides writing down 1263 unit. The 
remaining values of the liabilities are the following: 
 
Table 1   
 The sequence of the write down of liabilities (fictive data) 
Liability The value of the 
liability before 
using the bail-in 
tool (unit) 
Write down 
(unit) 
Compound 
write down 
(unit) 
The value of the 
liability after 
using the bail-in 
tool (unit) 
Common equity 
Tier 1 items 
 
524 524 524 0 
Additional Tier 1 
items 
195 
 
195 719 0 
Tier 2 instruments 254 254 973 0 
Subordinated debts 312 290 1263 22 
Rest of eligible 
liabilities 
5 604 0 1263 5 604 
 
An instrument could be reduced if the liabilities being on higher rank in the abovementioned hierarchy 
have already been reduced to zero. Therefore, the cost of the resolution is primarily paid by the owners 
and such creditors who have receivables related to eligible liabilities of the bank under resolution 
procedure.   
 
5. Financial background of the resolution mechanism  
 
According to the directive, the resolution authority has right to use the money of the fund for the 
followings: warranty or loan granting for the institution under resolution, buying the assets of these 
institutions, supporting the activity of the bridge institutions, asset management vehicle, lending to 
other financing arrangements or combination of the previously mentioned. However, the fund cannot 
be applied for capitalizing institutions in critical financial situation.  
The target level of the fund is 1% of the covered deposits that must be reached by the member states 
by the end of 2024. Due to this rule, the compound target is 1.8% together with the fund to be 
uploaded for deposit guarantee assurance. However, while the deposit guarantee schemes remain 
under member states management, the contribution paid for resolution mechanism is gathered in a 
common fund in case of euro zone member states. This fund is the so called Single Resolution Fund.      
 
Each member state has to ensure that the institutions pay contribution in order to fulfil the target level. 
The contribution is proportional which could be expressed in the following form:  
 
𝑅𝐶 =
𝐿−𝐶𝐷
𝑇𝐿−𝑇𝐶𝐷
  ,    (3) 
 
where  RC  ratio of the contribution,  
 L  liabilities of the credit institution,  
 CD the covered deposits from the liabilities,  
 TL total liability of the credit institution in the member state, 
 TCD the total covered deposits from the total liabilities in the member state. 
It means that the contribution of an institution has to be paid based on the amount of the uncovered 
liabilities in the bank compared with the uncovered liability portfolio in the member state in question. 
The highest level of uncovered liabilities the highest level of contribution.  
 
6. The forecasted level of the resolution funds 
 
The European Commission [2014a] declared in its statement the target level of the Single Resolution 
Fund which is EUR 55 billion. However, we prove this level is underestimated.  
Our calculation is partly based on survey made by the European Commission [2013]. The survey was 
made in 2007 at first but was repeated in 2009 and 2013. Data were provided by bank deposit 
guarantee schemes of the member states. Since the survey made by the Commission is related to the 
covered deposits and contribution to the resolution fund depends on their level (1%) we can forecast 
the level of funds (in case of euro zone member states it is the Single Resolution Fund and in case of 
non-euro zone member states they are the national resolution funds) 
Lots of discussion and negotiation were necessary among member states to implement a common 
resolution fund. Though, the operational mechanism is defined in the resolution regulation, the 
contribution of the member states to the common fund is not determined. Only, an intergovernmental 
agreement (Council of the European Union [2014]) regulates the measure of contribution of the 
member states. According to the agreement, participation in implementation of the Single Resolution 
Fund is compulsory for euro zone member states but others could also join. In the first year 40% of the 
available financial asset paid by the banks for resolution is to be transferred to the mutual resolution 
fund by the counterparties. In other words, 40% of the contribution paid by the banks operating in the 
territory of a euro zone member state could be used for mutual resolution of an institution operating in 
other country of the euro zone and 60% of the contribution might be spent on resolution of institution 
operating in the member state in question. In the second year additional 20% of the available sources 
must be transferred and after that this portion will be increased by 6 2/3 %. As a result of it 8 years is 
needed to reach the 100%. Taking the survey of the Commission into consideration, according to 
which the amount of the covered deposit portfolio was EUR 5 212 705 million
1
 in the euro zone at the 
                                                          
1
 Since in the meantime Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania became member of the euro zone, the related deposits 
are included  
end of 2012 and suppose it is not changing as well as suppose the Single Resolution Fund will be 
uploaded by equal amounts, the following level of the funds showed in the chart will be available for 
mutual resolution in the euro zone in the transitional period. 
 
 Chart 3  
Forecasted mutual fund available for resolution of euro zone institution in case the 
level of covered deposit does not change (EUR billion)
 
Source: European Commission[2013], own calculation 
 
Accepting the assumptions, the forecasted mutual resolution fund will be EUR 52 billion at the end of 
2024. Independently of the territorial location within the euro zone, this fund will be available for 
guarantee or loan granting for euro zone institution under resolution procedure, buying assets of these 
institutions, financing the activity of the bridge institutions, asset management vehicle.  
In case of member states outside the euro zone, the following forecasted level of national resolution 
fund will be after 2024 (if the level of covered deposit does not change):  
 
Chart 4  
Forecasted value of resolution funds of non-euro zone member states after 2024 in 
case the level of covered deposit does not change (EUR million) 
 
  Source: European Commission [2013]
2
, own calculation 
 
When compiling the charts above, we assumed data given as for 2012 remained unchanged. However, 
the portfolio of covered deposits is changing. The portfolio changing of the covered deposits depends 
on numerous factors. The size of the population, the level of the national GDP, the unemployment 
                                                          
2
 In case of Croatia there are no available data  
rate, the abroad activity of the credit institutions could have effect on the level of covered deposits 
belonging to one member state. In order to simplify our calculation compare the GDP of home country 
with the covered deposits reported in the Commission’s survey as for 2012. 
Chart 5  
The GDP in 2012 and the covered deposits of the member states as of 31/12/2012  
 
Source: European Commission[2013] and Eurostat
3
 
 
It is well visible that there is tight connection between national GDP and the level of the coverage 
deposits. Taking the continuous changing in the covered deposits into account we use linear regression 
to determine the level of covered deposits after 2024 where the level of covered deposits is dependent 
variable of the national GDP. In that case the equilibrium of the linear regression line is the following:  
 
     ?̂? = −12681.7 + 0.5424𝑥   (4) 
 
The value of the coefficient of determination (R
2
) is definitely high (0.95) which shows that our model 
is applicable. The equilibrium expresses that when the GDP increases by 1 EUR the covered deposit 
portfolio increases by 0.5424 EUR. If we calculate the forecasted value of the GDPs of the member 
states, we could determine the value of covered deposits, thus we could determine the level of 
resolution funds. We accept the forecast of the European Commission [2014b] regarding expected 
GDPs in period 2015-2016. As for period 2017-2024 we make 4 scenarios in case of each member 
state. We suppose the GDP growth will be 0%, 1%, 2% and 3%. The following table shows 1% of the 
forecasted covered deposits
4
 as of 12/31/2024 in case of different scenarios.  
 
Table 2 
1% of the forecasted covered deposits as of 31/12/2024 (EUR million) 
 Scenario 1 (0% 
average GDP 
growth) 
Scenario 2 (1% 
average GDP 
growth) 
Scenario 3 (2% 
average GDP 
growth) 
Scenario 4 (3% 
average GDP 
growth) 
Single resolution 
Fund 54 529 59 158 64 120 69 434 
National 
resolution funds 18 694 20 416 22 261 24 237 
Source: European Commission [2014a], own calculation 
                                                          
3  * non-euro zone member states. In order to demonstrate the covered deposits we used curve but the values can be 
interpreted only at the member states.  
4
 The target level of the resolution funds is 1% of the covered deposits. 
 Since the target level is determined as 1% of the covered deposits in the resolution regulation and 
directive, data given in the above table show practically the forecasted level of the Single Resolution 
Fund and the forecasted cumulative level of the national resolution funds.  
It is observable that the level expected by the Commission (EUR 55 billion) will be fulfilled even if 
there is no GDP growth after 2017 (in case of euro zone member states). However, its value will likely 
be significantly higher. In other words, the 1% proportion of the covered deposits defined in the 
abovementioned regulations ensures significantly higher level of the Single Resolution Fund 
comparing with the expected EUR 55 billion.  
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